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ARGUMENT 
From start to finish and contra to CST's claims, this case was i not aboi it Strickly 
Truckin's failure to honor the assignment from McCabe to CST, as it is undisputed that 
from January 2004 until August 2004, whenever Strickly received inv »fces fn »m i \ST, 
Strickly paid CST based upon those invoices after applying the authorized deductions. 
Therefore, it can not be said that Strickly refused I* i In »iii i Mi babe's assigtttitei ml \ \\ Imr 
accounts to CST and yet that is the exact claim made by CST in this action and 
accepted in error by the trial court wl let i gi ai ttinci < U'VI sutinii i i nniqi inent. 
From start to finish, this case had nothing whatsoever to do with Strickly refusing 
to honor McCabe's assignment IMII Mthei if hid "v^rvihinti IM «in wiln CST \\\ inq in 
force Strickly to pay to CST a debt truly owed by McCabe to CST, but that was not, and 
could not be due from Strickly because MrC^ho's debh dm* ID Stru kly grcdtl/ 
exceeded that total of all invoices received from CST and Strickly's reimbursements 
from McCabe came first under the terms ol the StneRk IVIt i \t\\\n Lease Agreement. 
UNDISPUTED LIMITATION OF 
STRICKLY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER LEASE AGREEMENT 
From the beginning, CST knew that Strickly's obligation to pay McCabe was 
limited by the terms of the Lease Agreement between Strickh i ,IIKI Met :abe, ainl 
acknowledged this fact when in paragraph #9 of its Complaint, CST stated "Broker 
signed an agreement with CST requiring Broker [Strickly] to st »t u I "nil /». lymenls 
otherwise due Trucker directly to CST/' [Rec Index Pg 2] 
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From the beginning, CST knew that any money it might have overpaid to 
McCabe was McCabe's responsibility to repay, not Strickly's obligation and so 
acknowledged this fact when, in paragraph #18 of its Complaint, CST admitted that: 
"Trucker's agreement with CST requires Trucker to repay all money advanced by CSTif 
not received by CST from Broker..." [Rec. Index Pg 4] 
CST again acknowledged this absolute limitation on the money due from Strickly 
to anyone when, in the first paragraph on page 15 of its brief, CST stated: 
"Furthermore, CST has never disputed that its right to receive payment from Strickly is 
contingent upon the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly." 
It is also undisputed that the pertinent terms of the September 2003 lease 
agreement between Strickly and McCabe were that: 
(1) McCabe would use his equipment and labor to haul loads for Strickly; 
(2) Strickly would allow McCabe to use Strickly's credit resources to purchase the 
fuel, repairs, supplies, and services required by McCabe's trucking operations; 
(3) McCabe was solely responsible for all expenses related to the operation and 
repair of his personally owned truck; 
(4) Strickly would pay McCabe for his labor and the use of his equipment after 
deducting the money McCabe owed to Strickly for reimbursement of the costs 
for fuel, repairs, supplies, and services provided to McCabe; and 
(5) Strickly would deduct 10% of the total due to McCabe for his use of Strickly's 
credit. (Addendum 1; Temporary Lease; 1J5, 6, 7) 
It is undisputed that under this Lease Agreement, Strickly was obligated to pay 
no more than the agreed price for the work completed by McCabe, less 10% of the 
gross and less all deductions for any credit extended by Strickly to McCabe for all 
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expenses previously incurred by McCabe and charged to Strickly's accounts. 
(Addendum 1; Temporary Lease; 1J5, 6, 7) 
Before CST entered into its factoring agreement with McCabe, it had known and 
accepted that the Lease Agreement absolutely limited the financial obligations of Strickly 
to McCabe and therefore to CST to pay for only those amounts Strickly owed to McCabe 
after all deductions were withheld. This fact was acknowledged when CST states in the 
first paragraph of its argument on page 11 of its brief that: 
The Lease Agreement also provided that McCabe would be responsible to 
repay Strickly for expenses incurred by Strickly to maintain and repair 
McCabe's truck during the pendency of the Lease Agreement. [Rec. Index pgs. 
50-51] 
From the beginning, CST knew that Strickly had overpaid McCabe more than it 
owed McCabe and acknowledged that fact when, in paragraph #14 of its Complaint, 
CST admitted that: 
" . . . CST advanced Trucker [McCabe] more money on the bill submitted by Trucker 
[McCabe] than Broker [Strickly] actually owed CST and Trucker [McCabe]" [Rec. 
Index Pg 3] To cure this problem with its case, CST created false accusations of fraud 
against Strickly as discussed below. 
From the beginning, CST knew that McCabe owed Strickly $13,718.01 for an 
engine overhaul that Strickly funded to McCabe's benefit. CST acknowledged this fact 
when, in paragraph #12 of its Complaint, CST stated "On or about May 19, 2004, 
Trucker did not notify CST that Trucker and Broker had agreed to have Broker pay for 
and engine overhaul on Trucker Semi-tractor in the amount of$13,718.01" [Rec Index 
Pg3] 
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As reported to the trial court in Tracy Strickland's affidavit, [Rec. Index Pg 565] 
and as reported to this Court [Appellate Brief page 15], it was undisputed that as soon 
as McCabe abandoned his Lease agreement, Strickly conducted a reconciliation of all 
of McCabe's credit expenses and invoices that had been presented to it which 
established that McCabe owed Strickly a total of $17,261.47 for expenses Strickly had 
incurred by McCabe's use of Strickly's credit accounts to include the engine repair 
balance of $7,178.01. [Rec Index Pg 202] 
It is also undisputed that even before the CST complaint was drafted, Strickly 
informed CST of the total of the overpayments that had been made by Strickly to 
McCabe and that when all debts owed to Strickly by McCabe were subtracted from the 
balance of all outstanding invoices that had been received from CST, Strickly had 
overpaid CST/McCabe $4,205.81. [Appellate Brief page 15]. 
As reported to the trial court in paragraph #11 of Strickly's counter claim, and in 
Tracy Strickland's affidavit, [Rec. Index Pg 565] and as reported to this Court [Appellate 
Brief page 15], when Strickly informed CST of Strickly's $4,205.81 overpayment after all 
allowable offsets had been applied and demanded a refund in that amount from CST, it 
received instead, a summons and complaint from CST. 
THE CST COMPLAINT - Breach of Contract 
CST filed the complaint in this matter alleging in paragraph #14 that Trucker and 
Strickly (Broker) had failed to notify CST of the engine overhaul and that the repair was 
not reflected on the bills submitted by CST to Strickly thus causing CST to overpay 
McCabe. [Rec. Index Pg 3] 
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Using this singular allegation as the sole grounds, CST went on in paragraphs 
#33, 41, and 42 of the complaint to accuse Strickly of committing a Breach of Contract 
by claiming that Strickly had breached a contract with CST by not paying CST the 
$8,655.96 that CST had demanded from McCabe and because Strickly had failed to 
inform CST of McCabe's engine repair. [Rec Index Pg 5,6] 
The problem with these claims of Breach of Contract against Strickly that brings 
this matter to this Court is that the McCabe assignment to CST cannot alter the 
obligor's duty or risk as CST correctly stated on page 13 of its brief: 
Utah law favors the assignability of contract rights, unless the assignment 
would add to or materially alter the obligor's duty of risk [the word or is used 
instead of the word of in the published report]. Lone Mountain Production Co. 
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 984 F.2d 1551, 1555 (10th Cir.1992) 
(citing Clark v. Shelton, 584 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1978)). And when an obligor 
receives proper notice of assignment, he must honor it. Cooper v. Holder, 21 
Utah 2d 40, 440 P.2d 15, 16 (Utah 1968). In this case McCabe's contractual 
right to receive payment from Strickly was freely assignable as it did not add to 
or materially alter Strickly's duty [or] of risk, and there was nothing that legally 
prevented McCabe from doing so. McCabe assigned his right to payment from 
Strickly to CST. [Rec. Index pg. 170]. CST was an assignee for consideration 
as it advanced McCabe eighty-five percent (85%) of the amount owed on the 
invoices before forwarding the invoices to Strickly for payment in full. [Rec. 
Index pg. 202]. Strickly agreed with CST to make payment for the amounts it 
owed McCabe directly to CST, but has failed to pay CST in full and therefore 
has breached its contractual obligations to both CST and McCabe. [Rec. Index 
pg. 202]. 
It is undisputed that Strickly was never obligated to pay any more than the 
agreed price for the work completed by McCabe, less 10% of the gross and less all 
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deductions for any credit extended by Strickly to McCabe for all expenses previously 
incurred by McCabe and charged to Strickly's accounts. (Addendum 1; Temporary 
Lease; lf5, 6, 7) 
It is undisputed that McCabe's assignment to CST of his rights to receive 
payments under the Lease Agreement could not, and did not alter Strickly's duties or 
increase its risks as defined in the Lease Agreement. 
It is undisputed that the Lease Agreement did not require Strickly to notify any 
third party (CST) of the agreement between Strickly and McCabe to fund the engine 
repair for McCabe and collect the balance back over time, nor did it alter Strickly's right 
to recover all expenses previously charged to Strickly's accounts by McCabe before it 
paid any remaining amount to McCabe. Because the assignment by McCabe could 
not, and did not alter Strickly's duties or increase its risks, the assignment could not and 
did not require Strickly to inform CST of McCabe's engine repair and did not require 
Strickly to pay CST what it demanded from McCabe before Strickly recovered all 
expenses previously charged to Strickly's accounts by McCabe. 
The only way Strickly could have incurred any contractual duty to inform CST of 
McCabe's engine repair or pay McCabe's debts due to CST before Strickly recovered 
its expenses from McCabe would have been if Strickly had entered a separate contract 
with CST thereby creating said duty. 
That separate contract would have required separate consideration from CST to 
Strickly, which undisputedly did not happen. Without a separate contract to alter 
Strickly's duties or increase its risks under the existing Lease Agreement, CST could 
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not as a matter of law present the trial court with any claims of a Breach of Contract 
against Strickly for which relief could be granted. 
All of the above information was before and should have been considered by the 
trial court when it ruled in error that a contractual obligation existed between Strickly 
and CST thus denying Strickly's Motion to Dismiss and again when the trial court ruled 
in error that Strickly had breached the contract with CST as alleged in its complaint and 
therefore granted summary judgment to CST even though it did not find any separate 
contract had been created nor any consideration given to Strickly by CST . 
Therefore it can only be ruled by this Court that that the trial court ruled in error 
and that McCabe's assignment to CST did not create any duty for Strickly that did not 
exist under the terms of the preexisting Lease Agreement which did not contain any 
contractual obligations for Strickly to notify CST or to pay CST anything before it fully 
recovered all of the expenses due to it from McCabe. 
THE CST COMPLAINT - Fraud 
All of the facts and argument presented immediately above pertain equally to the 
allegations of Fraud made by CST in paragraphs #39, 41, and 42 of its complaint. 
Although the trial court ruled in error that CST had sufficiently stated its claim of Fraud, 
the court assumed the statements made by CST were factual and apparently was not 
aware of the limitations created by the Lease Agreement which was before the trial 
court and which CST completely failed to mention it its complaint, even though it is was 
vitally aware of the agreement and therefore chose to create the Fraud claim to get 
around its limitations. Again, as with the Breach claim above, the only way Strickly 
could have incurred any contractual duty to inform CST of McCabe's engine repair 
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would have been if Strickly had entered a separate contract with CST thereby creating 
said duty. That separate contract would have required separate consideration from 
CST to Strickly, which undisputedly did not happen. 
Without a separate contract to alter Strickly's duties or increase its risks under 
the existing Lease Agreement, CST could not as a matter of law present the trial court 
with any claims of Fraud against Strickly for which relief could be granted. 
Therefore it can only be ruled by this Court that that the trial court ruled in error 
and that McCabe's assignment to CST did not create any duty for Strickly that did not 
exist under the terms of the preexisting Lease Agreement which did not contain any 
contractual obligations for Strickly to notify CST of expenses incurred by McCabe. 
However, even if there had been a separate contract, CST is in no position to 
make any fraud claims because it has made several material misrepresentations to the 
trial court and to this Court. For example, although it was CST that sent the two 
invoices showing deductions for engine repair to Strickly, in paragraph 28 on page 33 of 
the Harris Affidavit [Rec Index Pg 201], CST claimed that only after McCabe quit work 
did CST receive a $13,718.01 invoice for repairs to McCabe's truck engine and that 
before McCabe quit working CST knew nothing about the engine repair paid for by 
Strickly to McCabe's benefit. Apparently the trial court accepted this false statement as 
fact. However, the documents presented to the trial court supporting its Motion for 
Summary Judgement establish without question that in July 2004, Strickly received an 
invoice from CST that showed the first $3,000.00 monthly deduction and in August 
2004, Strickly received an invoice from CST that showed the second $3,000.00 
deduction for McCabe's engine repair. (Addendum 4) (Addendum 3; Invoice from CST 
10 
to Strickly #3215 dated 7/12/2004) exhibit 22 [Rec Index Pg 460] and 24 [Rec Index Pg 
503] 
Therefore, it is undisputed that CST sent to Strickly invoices showing two 
$3,000.00 deductions for engine repair during the two months before McCabe quit 
working, which is a direct contradiction to the statement made by CST under oath to the 
trial Court. Likewise, CST says on page 28 of its brief that "CST in no way lied to the 
trial court.. ."in referring to Strickly's claim that CST had not properly quoted a certain 
code section. 
However, in its brief CST says nothing whatsoever about being caught in a lie by 
the trial court on November 14, 2006, when CST's counsel, having admitted that he 
knew the due date for his response was June 27, 2005, had to admit that his response 
was not timely as it had not been filed until June 30, 2005 [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 3 Line 
1 -2]. But then CST's counsel tried to convince the court that he had actually filed the 
response and the Harris affidavit by fax on June 27, 2005, at which time the court noted 
that the Harris affidavit had not been signed until June 30, 2005. [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 
23 Line 9 - 1 9 ] CST's counsel then explained that he had always filed his pleadings 
supported by unsigned affidavits. [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 23 Line 14 - 22]. 
Another example of a serious misrepresentation is found on page 9 of CST's 
brief where it is stated that:" Although Strickly agreed with CST to pay CST directly for 
McCabe's invoices, Strickly has refused to do so and thus has breached its contractual 
agreements with both CST and McCabe." As discussed in detail above, Strickly never 
agreed to pay CST directly for McCabe's invoices without first deducting McCabe's 
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expenses and to knowingly make a statement to that effect with the obvious intent to 
mislead the Court is clearly not litigation in good faith. 
CST's mantra of "Strickly did not produce evidence to contradict the invoices 
provided by CST in support of its MSJ found throughout its brief, totally ignores the 
situation such as here, where the documents presented are most likely valid and thus 
were not controverted by Strickly, but the documents presented do not create the legal 
obligation claimed by CST in its complaint when it used half truths and omissions to 
formulate its complaint. 
Strickly did not make a verbatim restatement of each controverted fact simply 
because the facts alleged by CST, as alleged, are generally correct. However, as 
stated in Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition to MSJ, CST did not report anywhere in 
any of its pleadings that it based its complaint allegations solely on a factoring 
agreement between CST and McCabe to which Strickly was not a party, not upon the 
Lease Agreement between Strickly and McCabe that preexisted the factoring 
agreement and which limited all payments from Strickly to the benefit of McCabe to only 
that which Strickly owed to McCabe after all deductions for expense were made. 
Further, the statement made by Tracy Strickland in paragraph #12 of her affidavit 
[Rec Index Pg 565], "at the time Mike McCabe stopped working with Strickly Truckin he 
had been overpaid by several thousand dollars. Therefore, McCabe owes Strickly 
Truckin $4,205.81, not the other way around' has never been disputed by CST. The 
statement made by Tracy in paragraph #14 [Rec Index Pg 565], that "In the complaint, 
CST admits in paragraph #14 that McCabe actually received more money than he was 
owed by Strickly Truckin." has never been disputed and was admitted by CST in 
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paragraph #9 of its response to Strickly's Memorandum in opposition to CSTs MSJ. 
[Rec Index Pg 574]. Therefore, CST's claim found numerous times throughout its brief 
that Strickly did not produce evidence to contradict the invoices provided by CST is 
simply not factually correct. 
There are many such examples of half truths and complete fabrications made by 
CST to be found scattered throughout its various filings and in its brief, but complaining 
about the opposition does not move the dispute to final resolution. 
Finally, CST makes many remarks in its brief about how it was Strickly's 
responsibility to move the case forward in a timely fashion, not CST's and how the trial 
court ruled on each of Strickly's motions in a timely fashion. However, it is Strickly's 
position that regardless of the causes, without a great intervening catastrophe of some 
sort, it is not justice as described in the Utah Constitution Art. I; Section 11, "All courts 
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without 
denial or unnecessary delay" for the trial court to allow CST to create huge delays at 
each and every step of the process that ultimately result in more than 1,270 days 
passing before Strickly received an answer to its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant Strickly Truckin Inc., had an obligation under a written Lease 
Agreement to pay McCabe no more than the agreed price for the work completed by 
McCabe, less 10% of the gross and less all deductions for any credit extended by 
Strickly for all expenses previously charged to Strickly's accounts by McCabe. 
After entering the Lease Agreement, McCabe entered into a factoring agreement 
with CST by assigning his future income due from Strickly in exchange for instant 
money and a percentage to be held back by CST when, after deducting the expenses 
McCabe had incurred, Strickly paid the remaining amount due to McCabe. 
CST has never disputed that its right to receive any payment from Strickly was 
contingent upon the Lease Agreement between McCabe and Strickly. CST has also 
never disputed that the Lease Agreement absolutely limited Strickly's obligations to pay 
McCabe, and therefore to pay CST, only for those amounts Strickly owed after all 
deductions due from McCabe were withheld. 
When McCabe quit working, under the terms of the Lease Agreement, he owed 
Strickly $7,178.01 for engine repair and an additional $9,543.46 for fuel, repair, and 
service invoices that had been charged to Strickly but not paid and CST had over 
charged Strickly $357.75 for the Broker's fee. When McCabe quit working under the 
terms of the Factoring Agreement, he owed CST $8,234.00 for overpayments he had 
received based upon the invoices he had provided to CST. 
Clearly, McCabe owed money to Strickly and to CST, but rather than going to 
McCabe to recover its losses, CST sued Strickly falsely claiming it had failed to honor 
the assignment of McCabe's income less expenses along with suing McCabe. 
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While there is no argument that CST has a valid action against McCabe, CST 
can have no action against Strickly unless it shows an agreement separate from the 
subordinate factoring agreement to which Strickly was not a party and separate from 
the Lease Agreement which limited Strickly's obligations to no more than what it owed 
McCabe after all deductions. To support that separate agreement, consideration must 
have been given to Strickly by CST and it is undisputed that no such consideration 
exists. Therefore, McCabe owes Strickly Truckin $4,205.81 for the amount Strickly paid 
CST that was not due to McCabe after all expenses were paid. 
When the trial court granted CST its summary judgement, it did so based upon 
an incorrect interpretation of the Factoring Agreement to be a contract binding upon 
Strickly that required Strickly to pay CST amounts in excess of what it owed to McCabe 
under the preexisting Lease. Based upon that flawed interpretation, the court 
incorrectly granted the MSJ without making any specific findings for the basis of the 
contractual obligation, what the consideration had been, or even the terms of the 
contract which allegedly obligated Strictly to pay CST more that it owed to McCabe. 
Therefore it can only be ruled by this Court that that the trial court ruled in error 
when it denied Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss CST's Fraud and Breach of 
Contract claims against Strickly and that the trial court ruled in error when it granted 
Summary Judgment to CST on those same claims without making any findings 
concerning the limitations created by the preexisting Lease Agreement or as to the 
terms, conditions, and consideration involved in that contact it found existed between 
CST and Strickly Truckin Inc. 
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RESPECTFULLY RE SUBMITTED ON THIS 30th Day of November, 2009, 
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for Strickly Truckin Inc. 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this November 30, 2009,1 served a copy of the forgoing 
document, by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States Mails, 
addressed to: 
Dusten Heugly Mike McCabe, pro-se 
1375 South 100 East 1392 Martha Dunyon Circle 




THIS AGKEEMENT by and between f f M j * r f to fnW. . Of f f l ? CriV^icki^ | lpS$or . 
And Rill Wkbind Of Striddv Trockin M Lessee. And. 
WITNESSETH 
The Lessor hereby leases to the Lessee the following described Motor Vehicle ^uiDmenr . . . .
 0 _-
TmctorNo. lfeflST License \Z\\X\ VIK \ y ? ^ m ^ X o r T U H l ^ ( a & T 
Trailer No. License Trailer No. License,, 
For a penod of: Commencing AT: 12:01 A M The \ 3 v Day of flgjp 20 Q5 
And Expiring At: 11:59 P.M The Day of 20 . * 
1. The Lessor warrants that the said motor vehicle equipment described above is in good, sound and safe mechanical 
condition, and in all respects in full conformity with the requirements of the Department of Transportation. The Lessor 
further agrees that the equipment shall be maintained at its sole expense for the duration of this agreement 
2. The Lessor agrees that said equipment will be subject to inspection by the Lessee's aggnt and other authorized 
employees at the Lessee's regular inspection stations, before the start of any trip and at any place necessary en route. It 
is further understood and agreed that if, after the inspection, in the opinion of flic Lessee's agent or authorized 
employtes, the equipment is not safe and in proper condition, then the Lessor shall immediately have said equipment 
repaired and put in safe mechanical condition at its sole expense. 
3. The Lessor further agrees that the Lessee will not be held responsible for any damage to, or loss or destruction of said 
motor vehicle(s), as occasioned by accident, collision, upset, negligence, fire, theft, act of God, Of any Other means 
whatsoever while the said motor vehicle(s) is operated under the provisions of the lease, it being expressly understood 
that the said Lessor specifically hereby releases the Lessee from liability for such damage, loss or destruction of said 
equipment The Lessor further agrees to hold the Lessee harmless and free of any claims by any other parties 
whosoever having, or claiming, any interest, equitable or otherwise, in the above described motor vehicle equipment. 
4. The Lessor agrees to pay all taxes for the use of the highways, ferric arid bridges, and to furnish its own supply of fuel, 
oil and maintenance of said motor vehicles, together with airy other expenses whatsoever incurred by or incidental to 
the operation of said equipment 
5. The Lessor agrees that all fuel, oil, tires> and repair parts will be obtained from independent dealers, and it is fully 
understood that the Lessee shall not be called upon to furnish any parts, supplies, or services incidental to (he operation 
of the equipment other than as is herein provided. The Lessor shall immediately reimburse any parts, supplies, or 
services furnished by the Lessee in full to the Lessee or amounts due will be deducted from compensation due 
6. All expenses incurred to operate said equipment in compliance with USDOT regulations and any other requirements 
will be the responsibility of the Lessor during the term of this lease, Such shall include but are not limited to 
registration fees, fuel tax preparation and fees, insurance, inspections, permits, violations, etc. Any and all amounts 
incurred by Striddy Truckin in behalf of said equipment will be charged directly back to the lessor and will be deducted 
front amounts due to the Lessor. 
7. The lessor agrees to be responsible to maintain and repair the equipment in a safe and operable condition at his or her 
own expense, Any expense charged to Striddy Truckin, including fuel and oil purchases, will be reimbursed in a 
timely manner, or will be deducted from any amounts due to the Lessor. If lessor is given a company credit card it is 
with understanding that it is for business expenses only. Hie lessor will be held responsible for all charges on any 
credit card given to them. 
8. The Lessor agrees to employ and furnish all drivers for said equipment and to pay the wages of said drivers while in its 
employ, it being expressly understood that such matters as Withholding Tax, Social Security, Unemployment Insurance 
and Workmen's Compensation are the responsibility of the Lessor. Controlled substance testing as required by GFR 
Part 382 will/will not be the responsibility of the Lessee. 
9. The Lessor agrees to fully indemnify the Lessee for damage to property or person of a third party resulting from fire, 
theft, collision, or upset and to folly indemnify the Lessee for damage to cargo arising from any or all of these causes 
10. When possession of the leased equipment is taken by the Lessee, said Lessee, or agent thereof, shall give to the Lessor 
of the equipment a receipt specifically identifying the equipment and stating the date and time of day possession thereof 
is taken (reference above). When the possession by the Lessee ends, the Lessor or agent thereof; shall provide to the 
Lessee a receipt specifically identifying the equipment and stating therein the date and the time of day possession it 
returned to the Lessor. 
11. The Lessor is/is not operating under the Lessee certificate of authority. The Lessee shall exercise exclusive possession 
and control over the said vehicle equipment during the time said equipment is operating within this lease agreement 
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